Care Ethics and Vulnerability: A Modification to Virginia Held’s Account

Abstract

The ethics of care is a relatively recent approach within moral philosophy that offers a different way of understanding and analysing both moral issues and addressing moral problems. Originally developed to contrast with justice ethics, it provides new options for morality and its improvement, insofar as it has the potential to be grounded on the universal experience of care. In this dissertation, I will be exploring this potential. In so doing, I will be taking Virginia Held’s account of care ethics as my main point of reference.

The central problem within this dissertation is that care ethics, particularly Virginia Held’s account, focuses on dependency rather than vulnerability, and although dependency and vulnerability are terms used interchangeably, I aim to show, in the second chapter, their differences. With this distinction apparent, I will look to Martha Fineman and her theory of vulnerability; note- this theory is used within the political sphere, and I aim to develop it into Held’s moral account. If this is approach is applicable within Held’s care ethics account a more universal theory could be made that would encompass all human beings, due to the fact that vulnerability is a necessary part of the human condition. 

I. The Ethics of Care

Before I get to the distinction between dependency and vulnerability (in chapter II) and then explore the advantages of a shift from dependency to vulnerability as the basis for care ethics (in chapter III), I first need to make it clear what care ethics is (first section of this chapter) and what makes it distinctive from other, dominant approaches to morality (second section of this chapter).

(i) What is care ethics?

Care ethics recognises the moral importance and relevance of previously discounted caring practices. It thereby takes a different approach to the legal and political practices of dominant moral theories, such as Kantian ethics and utilitarianism, which are based upon universal principles and rules, with obligations, rights, and impartial judgements at their core. These so-called justice or rights theories claim that individuals are motivated to act as they should by recognition of rational thought: for instance, the Categorical Imperative in Kantian theory or the Principle of Utility in utilitarianism. By contrast, care ethics invites a different view of morality by viewing persons as relational and interdependent, partly constituted by their relationships – more specifically, their caring relations – with others. Where dominant moral theories understand moral relationships as voluntarily entered into by free and equal persons, the ethics of care develops itself for the concrete realities of unequal power and unchosen relationships.

Care ethics first emerged out of work in moral psychology. In the work of Carol Gilligan’s In a Different Voice (1982), Gilligan argued that males often adopt a tendency towards justice – or rights – based principles, whereas females lean towards care values in their moral reasoning. This idea was taken up by many feminists, and for Kymlicka, who understands care and justice as two separate ‘moral projects’. This distinction confined women’s dispositions to the private sphere of family life as it places emphasis that care is a moral project, mainly for women, further reinforcing gendered notions. Following from this, such a project seems clearly to fail in holding the kind of impartial approach to morality and justice that is needed within the public realm. Despite this, it is argued that how one thinks they reason, rather than how one actually reasons, is influenced by the moralisation of gender. Perhaps this notion of gender and care and justice ethics stems from the view that men and women feel that they should be concerned with a particular way of thinking rather than their actual thoughts differing like previously thought.

The work of Gilligan contributed to the publishing of a feminist collection, Justice and Care: Essential Readings in Feminist Ethics (1995), edited by Virginia Held, which will be of important influence within my discussion. It brought together leading work by feminist philosophers exploring the idea of an ethics of care. As mentioned already, I will be focusing on Held’s approach to care ethics. Held is a moral, political, and social philosopher whose work has been influential in shaping and critiquing the traditional roles of women within society. More relevant to our purposes here, Held is a care ethicist who strongly defends the view that care ethics is a distinctive moral theory, separate from more traditional dominant moral theories. Some theorists, however, refute this belief and rather see that care ethics as compatible with an adaption of Kant’s categorical imperative, and see a compatibility between care ethics and a Kantian liberal tradition.

So, what, more precisely, is “care ethics”, for Held and others? There is a difficulty in precisely defining care ethics due to the nature of care as a practice, rather than a set of rules or principles. The defining feature of care is its practicality, and due to its practical nature, care ethics must refer to the dynamics of specific contexts and the relations among concrete individuals. Despite this apparent personal scope, care need not be limited to the “private” sphere in which it so often is. Although all moral theories are in some sense relational, care ethics has a special relational nature. It begins from a self-characterised position through a connection and grasp that life is dependent upon this connection – a bond of attachment, rather than agreement. So, while it may initially seem that the relational values associated with good care belong exclusively to the private sphere of life, care ethicists argue that they can, and should, be expanded to wider domains.

The work of Virginia Held gives rise to care ethics as a potential novel normative theory – with focus on the understanding of the relation between the moral agent and the care provided. Care ethics understands that individuals start out as dependent infants and can in some case remain dependent for the rest of their lives. For Held, the ethics of care is centred on the recognition of the value of care, especially in relation to children, as without care they would not have the capacity to evolve into the ‘traditional’ independent agent, as it is morally understood. Held states that “persons can exist without justice, but they cannot exist without the value-laden care essential for every child to live”.She sees the ethics of care as committed to actual experience, where care is a set of values and practices,, whereby the caregiver has appropriate motivations to care for others. Held argues that dominant moral theories are based on the presumption of an already established social web of relation(ships), yet it is not the case, most individuals remain self-interested in all actions they partake in. However, the influence of care ethics is able to allow for social relationshipsto be established, forming interdependent relationships, rather than a self-interested notion.

For advocates of ethics of care, more specifically Held, argues that without the necessity of care the traditional image of the ideal moral person cannot be reached, as all persons are dependent upon another person at the beginning of their lives. All persons begin as children who require care from others, making them dependent on those who provide it. This care that infants are dependent upon often goes beyond mere survival to provide a form of care that is given for the sake of them being a person’s child. Thus, it leads to interdependence with others throughout life, “the focus of the ethics of care is on the compelling moral salience of attending to and meeting the needs of the particular others for whom we take responsibility for”. Responsibility for others is not something one can choose to have when they feel like it, especially within the mother-child relationship the mother’s responsibility to her child remains a constant feature that can vary on the level of care required, but the responsibility of care is nevertheless still present.

For the care ethicist, caring relations populate moral life, the interests of the self and others becoming inextricably linked, and trust is crucial. An example of this can be seen within the mother-child relationship: when a mother cares for her child she does so with a mutual interest that will be beneficial for both her and the child. In valuing her relationship with the child, the mother understands the importance of care and by providing it she places the child’s preferences on par with her own. This may not be a care that is extended to all persons universally, but instead to particular others that she shares a caring relation with. This could either be family, or friends, or fellow citizens within her community. Moral theories that differ from this, assuming only individuals pursue their own interests within the universal rules and its constraints that follow, are unsuited to dealing with the actual realities that a caring relation between persons poses. Ethics of care views persons as relational, rather than self-sufficient and argues for an equal consideration for experiences that show the importance of caring as well as its significance.

Although ethics of care is seen as a feminist approach it should not be equated with feminist ethics. Some feminists feel the early versions of ethics of care failed to offer an account of how women differ between one another, reinforcing traditional stereotypes of women as selfless nurturers, leaving the “public” sphere to men. Onora O’Neill, for instance, argues that this is a possible consequence of the ethics of care, when she contends that, “a stress on caring and relationships […] may endorse relegation to the nursery and the kitchen to purdah and to poverty. In rejecting ‘abstract liberalism’, such feminists converge with traditions that have excluded women from economic and public life”. However, Fiona Robinson disagrees, stating, “It is only a narrow, ‘orthodox’ ethics of care- the view of care as essentially a morality for women, belonging to the private sphere […] – to which these criticisms apply”. Held agrees with Robinson, as she sees that the ethics of care has gone beyond the earliest formulations of the work of Gilligan, and has become a theory that is shifting from a complete feminist outlook which can be applied to all individuals, regardless of gender norms.

(ii) Care vs. Justice

The development of care ethics brought to the fore a question about how we should view the relationship between the two broad approaches to morality. The debate between the ethics of care and the ethics of justice stems from the view that these theories are incompatible with one another. Whilst care ethics focuses on a more (inter)dependent and particularist view of morality, justice theories rely on an autonomous conception of individuals and a focus on universal abstract principles that can be applied to all persons in all contexts. In this section, I will set out the main differences between these two approaches to morality and explain how, for Held, the former offers an unsatisfactory account of human morality. However, despite Held’s concerns, justice-based theories can, arguably, provide a better moral guidance.

Justice theories are based on the principle that universal rules can and are applied impartially to particular cases, including the awareness of fairness, rights, and obligations to all individuals. However, care ethics differs in that it remains sensitive to selective others, particularly those whom we have a pre-established connection with, in previous historical circumstances. As a result, trust is cultivated, and a person’s needs are responded too. Care ethics differs to justice ethics, insofar that it aims to understand that all individuals start out as dependent infants, and in certain cases can remain dependent on others for the entirety of their lives; unlike dominant theories, such as Kantian ethics, that sees individuals as autonomous agents. Without care all individuals would, for the rest of their lives, remain interdependent on others as they would not be able to fully develop their capacities in order to become autonomous beings. The main focus I shall be looking at within justice theories is the idea of autonomy in comparison to dependency.

Justice theories, such as Kantianism, understand ‘right’ as a distinct and independent feature of human rational, perceiving it as absolute. Justice requires individuals to respect what is right and places a particular priority on undesirable circumstances or consequences. Within Kant’s Groundwork ofMetaphysics of Morals (1785), he sees justice as intwined with external actions that are not dependent upon their fulfilment or motives. Justice ethics holds a core belief that to ensure an objective, and universal decision can be made within ethics, all individuals are seen to hold objective, autonomous, and impartial capacities. For justice theories,society is made up of “independent, autonomous units who cooperate only when the terms of cooperation are such as to make it further the ends of each of the parties”, according to Brian Barry. Justice theories have been the dominant approach within moral theories, a main influence is Kantian ethics, where this justice based account takes perfect duties – aperson must do certain actions at all times – to be universal; offering principles that can be held by everyone, irrespective of external factors.

Held sees care ethics as anti-Kantian; Kantian deontology relies upon the application of a liberal political assumption to the morality of life as a whole – aiming to maximise freedom of choice, and an individual’s right – whilst continuously ignoring emotions and the moral guidance they can provide. The traditional justice theories reduce one’s moral understanding to a singular principle and abstract rules. To what extent is this criticism fair? Autonomy, for Kant, is understood as, “The property the will has of being a law to itself (independently of every property belonging to objects of volition)”. For Kant’s Categorical Imperative to work, a person’s autonomy must be seen as a theoretical condition – itis one’s own will that determines principles, we self-govern our morality. Within his work, Kant talks of a kingdom of ends; virtue is built upon equal relations with one another that adhere to his Formula of Humanity: “act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only”. Therefore, it can be seen that Kant does not ignore the principle of maintaining relations, and commitments with others which offers a similar approach to that of the ethics of care. This goes against Held, who views Kantian ethics as completely incompatible with care ethics. However, despite this Kant fails to capture the care ethicists view that emotions are natural and not just a duty. Care should not be seen as a duty alone; individuals are inclined to care for others, and this matters for morality.

A justice theory attempts to focus on universality, Gillian states,

“From a justice perspective, the self as moral agent stands as the figure against a ground of social relationships, judging the conflicting claims of self and others against a standard of equality or equal respect (the Categorical Imperative, the Golden Rule). From a care perspective, the relationship becomes the figure, defining self and others. Within the context of relationship, the self as a moral agent perceives and responds to the perception of need”.

Those in a caring relation are not competing for benefits, rather the caregiver and cared for share a mutual interest in their wellbeing. A person’s moral action expresses and maintains our connections to particular others. Traditional dominant theories are arguably a ‘masculine’ theory.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     Within justice theories, principles are agreed by society to form a social contract. Their main thesis is seeing individuals as autonomous agents, Lorraine Code sees this notion of autonomy as self-sufficiency which allows individuals to live independent lives. Thus, justice theories hold a belief that independence is to be valued over interdependent relations, such as friendship, loyalty, trust, and caring. Relationships and social practices that are based on interdependence threaten autonomy. Justice theories understanding of autonomy, unlike care ethics notions, do not fail to address the complex effects of oppression on agents’ capacities for autonomy.

Justifications for our duty to care for others is limited,arguably it rests on nothing more than self-interest. However, care theorists resist this view as it conflicts with what it means to be a moral and caring person. Justice theories take rational and autonomous individuals as their starting point when referencing the best approach to morality, excluding the necessity of dependency as to isolate the autonomous moments. This, however, creates problems as these justice theories become dependent upon an individualist starting point, with recognition of other humans as purposive agents. Care theories, by contrast, are able to avoid this problem, as obligations are built upon a shared common dependency between all parties, rather than an autonomous agency. It can be seen as (1) humans require a basic care to help their development; and (2) individuals who value their capabilities and survival must recognise care as a necessary good in helping achieve this. For Held, justice theories do not provide a basis for this since they are often reliant on self-sufficiency and look to universal rules that do not take into accountshared experiences.

Held points out an inadequacy of justice-based moral theories by taking Thomas Hobbes’ idea of a “state if nature” as an illustrative example: “Before there could have been any self-sufficient, independent men in a hypothetical state of nature, there would have to have been mothers and the children these men would have been”. If these children were to become the self-sufficient, independent men that is outlined, then anecessary amount of care would have been needed in order to help attain an autonomous status, rather than being dependent on others. The individual self is reliant on both understanding and recognising their need for others. Relationships like this are formed within the mother-child relationship, since both persons give and receive mutual contributions that establish and confirm their needs as individuals, as well as developing their web of relationships. Once these larger relationships begin to form, the goal is to maintain this unit, and individualistic autonomy and self-sufficiency is rather replaced with a relational autonomy. This relational autonomy notion is a new feminist concept that aims to readjust the imbalance of agency and social embeddedness that does not promote an extremely individualistic liberal atomism. The core focus of relational autonomy is to shift the dominant understanding of the autonomous self from an individualistic one to one which is embedded in a social context.

Care ethicists rely on the mother-child relationship as an example which can show the demands of mortality. However, does it really provide a basis on which these demands can be theorised? One issue that arises is the notion of the mother-child relationship is that it is often overly romanticised, and therefore cannot provide a representation that can be applied to many people’s experiences. The level of care and dependency depicted within the mother-child relationship is inherently unequal, and care ethicists often promote it as that of an equal relationship. However, it is not a voluntary relation as the mother holds the greater responsibility and power over the child. A second problem the care ethicist facesis the inescapable notion that care is rooted in experience, something which is further emphasised through personal relationships. Care requires trust between giver and receiver, with sensitivity and empathy paramount in maintaining this mutual need. Despite this, in most cases care is between friends and family and transitioning from personal to global can lead to psychological problems arising; care between people we have close relations to, which is built into our nature and extending this to persons we do not know can be difficult. As Michael Ignatieff expresses, “We recognise our humanity in our differences, in our individuality, our history, in the faithful discharge of our particular culture of obligation. There is no identity we can recognise in our universality. There is no such thing as love of the human race, only love of this person for that, in this time and not in any other”.

If care can be broadened onto those in which we do not know, rather than staying as a virtue it may become a vice. Rather than care being a practice that individuals partake in to maintain relationships that benefit both parties, if it becomes a forced practice those who are dependent upon care may find this help condescending and ungenuine. Thus, attention must be drawn towards those receiving care and not the caregiver. However, when looking at the perspective of the individual receiving care, care from an intermediate family member or friend is through reciprocal respect and love. Yet if care was to be given from a completely unknown stranger it might become humiliating or patronising, as what is required is an understanding of ones needs as a justice, and not sympathy. Care cannot be something one claims, therefore in relation to human dignity the ethics of care cannot emphasise this importance.

Overall, I have argued that justice-based theories can arguably provide a better moral guidance as they allow individuals to look to a singular moral principle that is universally applicable in all situations, regardless of context or relational status with other individuals. With specific regards to Kantian deontology, it is, arguably, alike to care ethics with its thoughts on maintaining relations with others. However, the next chapter aims to explore what justice theories lack with reference to vulnerability, in comparison to care ethic theories.

II. Dependency and Vulnerability: What Justice Theories Lack

It can be understood then, from the first chapter, that Virginia Held understands there to be a clear distinction between care ethics and justice-based theories. This difference is that care ethics is able to take the appropriate account of understanding dependency and vulnerability. This is fundamental if we are to endorse the care ethicists standpoint as an approach that, unlike justice-based theories, is better suited to all individuals. However, this chapter will show that dependency and vulnerability are two distinct properties, and Held’s approach is not (fully) compatible since it does not make aware this difference.

(i) The difference between dependency and vulnerability

Care ethics has great focus on dependency and vulnerability within its work. Despite this, however, justice-based theories have arguably remained as a better suited moral theory due to the universally applicable principles they provide throughautonomy and independence. Individuals are dependent upon other humans at some various stage in their lives; childhood, old age, disability, and illness are just a few cases that one becomes dependent on care and support from others. The ethics of care acknowledges this as fundamental, while justice theories fail to address this importance as their notions of autonomy and independence relate only to rational and healthy adulthood. Justice theories leave out this important aspect of human experience.

For the purpose of this chapter I will clarify the meanings of the terms ‘vulnerable’ and ‘dependent’. To be vulnerable is to be “able to be easily, physically, emotionally, or mentally hurt, influenced or attacked” and to be dependent is “needing the support of something or someone in order to continue existing or operating”. Martha Fineman, both a political and feminist philosopher, claims that dependency and vulnerability are two different notions and should not be used as loosely and interchangeably as previous care ethicists do. Dependency is limited as a basis for moral theory as it is temporary and intermittent. It is dismissed as contingent and secondary to politics. Many theorists argue that it represents a stage that individuals pass through before (sometimes after) achieving their full normative status as a liberal autonomous citizen. Many theories see dependency as confined to the private sphere of an individual’s life, family and friends. When one cares for others outside this scope it becomes a construction of individual choice and norm of personal responsibility.

There is a distinction between dependency and vulnerability.Vulnerability is, on Fineman’s view, a constant and universal feature of human experience. It is not concerned with specific groups or minorities and is rather a factor of constant possible harm that all, even the most independent and autonomous individuals, are susceptible to. Therefore, it is not something that can be closed off to the private realm of life, and rather it is a central fact to the human condition. Vulnerability for human beings is manifested through our development within the world, making us susceptible to factors beyond our control that can be either trivial or catastrophic, through injury, illness, or a failure to develop and grow. Vulnerability afflicts all individuals, who, by societal norms and standards, can look after themselves. Dependency, on the other hand, is a branch of vulnerability that results in an individual’s need for support from a specific person (people) or caregiver. When someone is dependent, they find themselves in a particular circumstance that requires a reliance of care to provide for their needs, which will ultimately allow for the development and attainment (in the case of an infant) of one’s agency or autonomy. In these cases of dependency, the individual is unable to easily or responsibly address their current situation, and thus a direct and immediate reliance on the support of a set person or group is required. Thus, the difference between dependency and vulnerability can be understood, with physical health as an example for a broader distinction, asindividuals being vulnerable to illness, disease and injury, but only some people at certain times are dependent on medical help and care.  

Vulnerability is a factor that can affect all human beings as it is able to cut across previous challenges of identity: some illustrations include, gender, sexual orientation, class, race, or ethnicity. For Fineman, the focus on identity-based discrimination deflects attention from broader questions concerning justice. Thus, Fineman regards the vulnerable subject model as a “post-identity” – it moves from a central focus on marginalized groups of people; for example,disabled, and rather attempts to establish the common vulnerabilities everyone in society shares. This analysis of the justice obligations owed to citizens is able build a more inclusive mode of moral theorizing. Vulnerability, unlike dependency, is part of the human condition which results in its inevitability to harm individuals during their life.

The relationship between vulnerability and dependency is an inescapable feature that our embodiment brings about due to the risk of failure or harm of essential flourishment needed to develop this embodiment. Humans are susceptible to all varieties of vulnerabilities by a wide range of factors: natural or constructed physical environments; legal or social institutions; and individual knowledge, capacities, and skills.Despite vulnerability conditioning human life there has been little analysis on it as a concept itself. Although it has often been undertheorized, Held and other care ethicists have highlighted vulnerability’s significance interchangeably with the term dependency. Dependency, on the other hand, as has been discussed is brief or temporary instances of vulnerability within an individual’s life whereby they rely on care from others that develops, promotes, or exercises autonomy.

(ii) Do justice theories fail to adequately acknowledgehuman dependency and vulnerability?

So far, then, we have established that dependency and interdependent relations with others play a fundamental role throughout one’s life. Our relations are what constitute our identity; this does not mean one cannot be an autonomous agent, but rather that it is the interdependencies within a web of relations that allows this to become possible. The idea that autonomy is just there, and present, is misleading. For Eva Kittay, this notion gives rise to an illusion that society is created of equal, free, and independent agents who choose their relations. It ignores the reality that all persons are dependent in their childhood, at various points throughout their lives, and that groups and persons are interdependent in the modern world.

Justice theories make the assumption that all individuals become rational and autonomous agents over the course of their childhood and adolescence, and by time most people are normal adults they are fully autonomous agents. However, they do recognize that this is not the case for everyone, for instance: those with certain disabilities. Yet, liberal theories often are not able to deal with these cases well, as MarthaNussbaum argues in her book, Frontiers of Justice (2007). The project is understood best as an alternative to dominant moral ethical approaches and attempts to provide alternatives to the limits of narrow rationalism. In relation to the exclusion of individuals with disabilities, Rawlsianism, for instance, does not provide a theory that can be applied to those individuals due to the assumption that Rawls believes all individuals to be free, equal and independent. Not only do justice theories face problems with individuals who are physically disabled, but those who are mentally impaired are excluded too, specifically in Rawls’ account since he uses a Kantian account of personhood.

Not only does the exclusion of those who are disabled arise out of Rawls’ theory, it also excludes those who are non-disabled. The periods of life when someone is dependent on others – in old and young age, temporary illness or a restriction of mobility for a short period time – would be excluded within this justice theory. Justice theories become excluding to even the most autonomous and rational agent during these, often, temporary dependent moments of life. For justice theories, when persons are dependent and rely on the care of other individuals to provide for their basic needs, it stunts any advancement an individual has in achieving more agency and autonomy. Justice theories fail to account for individuals’ dependency and for the fact that vulnerability is a universal characteristic of the human condition.

Importantly, Virginia Held thinks that we need both care and justice theories for our values and practices, and that we need justice to champion our rights and demand equality and fairness. Held argues that we need justice theories to show why care must be prominent and disruptive justice should consider this. The labor of care should not be left to families and friends, and society should take responsibility. However, justice cannot adequately cover the concerns of care. Held still sees both theories to be incompatible, since justice theories are persuasive only in limited legal and political contexts.

Is Held right about the incompatibility? One philosopher who sees the integration of justice and care as essential is Daniel Engster. In, The Heart of Justice (2007), Engster believes that care theory should be incorporated within traditional dominant justice theories to ensure that all individuals are, by right, able to receive the necessary minimum of care. Furthermore, he sees care ethics as a practice that justice-based theories can be built upon. Care principles are fundamental to justice theories, as without basic caring practices which are fundamental in aiding and fostering the growth of society and individual liberty, it would not be attainable. He writes, for instance, that: “No theory of justice cab be said to be consistent or complete without integrating the institutional and policy commitments of care theory”.

Held, however, does not think that justice theories can adequately cover concerns of care, and that an alternative approach is needed. The distinctive outlook of care understands that individuals are both dependent and interdependent throughout their lives. Held sees that Engster’sapproach is only going so far as to apply a theory of justice to care approaches. Care is essential, and without it we cannot flourish or survive, and care should be considered a right that all are entitled to. There should be a new moral theory and not just a new application of dominant moral theories.

The core normative focus of Kantian ethics is on the dignity or absolute worth that human beings have in virtue of their capacity for rational agency. Justice theories, like Kantian ethics, are based on an a priori moral principle and therefore cannot take into account contingent facts about human vulnerability. They are theories of autonomy, but autonomy implies an ideal of a detached, independent rational agent, and is thus incompatible with the acknowledgment that human beings are vulnerable and dependent.  

The dominant model of autonomy is criticized by Martha Fineman, who believes that this model fails to address and recognize the interdependence and dependence of individuals within society. Fineman rather looks at the accounts of government and legal policy, that has embedded the connotations that autonomy is linked with individuality and masculinity. But this is not the case and autonomy, to allow for human flourishing, must include an account of dependency. This legal approach to autonomy fails to address the needs outlined within care ethics, and rather a relational approach to autonomy should be taken. This is outlined within care ethics who aim to reframe the approach to provide for a more dependence-based outlook, rather than a strict independent understanding. Relational autonomy sees the self as one who remakes themselves in relation to their ever-evolving web of relations, which exist fundamentally in relation to others.

Justice is needed both in the family, and in the state; just as care is needed in both. If we continue to see justice and care as alternative interpretations that can be applied to the same moral problems, we are left with the question of which interpretation to apply when we ought to act. For Held, justice deals with the moral minimums – the requirements that one should not go below as to avoid injustice. In contrast, care deals with what is above this moral minimum, honoring more than just rights. Yet, this is not made clear by Held. Justice and rights are absolute bonds or moral constraints that guide a good life, and include for the most part, the development of caring relationships. Justice is an important value for persons, however within the private realm of the family it is not of big concern. Care is the most important; thus, we can have care without justice. Ergo, without care there would be no public system of rights, yet it is not primary and is more inclusive as a value. Justice should be demanded; however, it shouldn’t push care into the margins.

We can treat persons as individuals, as the bearers of individual rights, for the sake of constructing just political and legal institutions. However, the reality that persons are relational and interdependent should not be forgotten. Autonomy should be valued within a framework of trust. For Held, care is the broader network within which justice should be fitted. However, this focus on prescribing the notion, and placing great emphasis on independence and self-sufficiency is not what these dominant theories see as the individual to solely be. Held’s account neglects the transformative role an integrated moral theory can play. Her theory is limited since she is reluctant to promote an inclusive theory of justice and care, still viewing them as concerning a related but separate domain. In Held’s words, “caring relations should form the wider moral framework into which justice should be fitted. Care seems the most basic moral value. As a practice, we know that without care we cannot have anything else, since life requires it”.

In reframing care ethics around vulnerability, more justification for an overall general responsibility of care can be made. Where previous arguments centre around dependency, all individuals have a responsibility to help those who require it. However, the problem with centring care on dependency is that it dominantly refers to only personal-dependency care. Engster, makes a problematic claim in that he argues that since care for persons can come without warning it is impossible to know who might need care during their life, ergo when possible individuals should help others when needed. If we agree with this statement, it follows that out of consistency we ought to care for others when it is required. However, dependency is limited and creates a weakness since we only then ought to care for particular others at specific points and makes no requirements to care for those we are not in direct contact with.

III. Rethinking Held’s Account of Care Ethics in Terms of Vulnerability

This chapter explores Held’s account in more detail and sets out what it lacks with reference to care. It then looks at Fineman’s vulnerability theory, and how – if integrated into Held’s ethics of care – it can provide a more encompassing moral theory. By shifting to an account of vulnerability it allows for care ethics to be strengthened in relation to the responsibility to care for others. Vulnerability means protecting individuals; understanding care ethics in vulnerability terms would mean caring for individualsthroughout their entire lifetime, from both short spans of their life, to factors that are out with one’s control. Thus, it can bring care from being seen predominantly within the private realm to the public realm that can requisition implementation from government sectors, rather than individuals.

(i) The problem with Held’s focus on dependency

Held envisions a more caring society. However, her account is narrow as it relies on dependency, rather than vulnerability, giving the notion that individuals only require care when they are in these dependent states: infancy, illness, and so forth. For Held, the central focus of the ethics of care is attending to and meeting the needs of particular others that we take responsibility for. She sees care as a theory which evaluates the various aspects of care and caring relations; however, her reliance on the concept of dependency limits this evaluation as care becomes ascribed to specific properties that de-value human vulnerability as a constant factor which remains fixed indefinitely.

Held understands dependency to be an important aspect within the care one receives and how this is valuable for remainder of their lives. This is further seen within Susan Dodds’ work, “Dependence, Care, and Vulnerability”. Doddsargues that vulnerability and dependency are inherent characteristics of human existence that are rooted from our neediness, embodiment, and social and affective nature. For Dodds, dependency equates to personal care, and vulnerabilities are tackled through institutional practices rather than personal relations. An example Dodds uses within her work is the dependence of the infant, where their almost-complete dependency on others is apparent due to their lack of autonomy. This, mostly, comes from individual personal attention that allows for their physical, emotional, and cognitive domains to be developed into autonomous agents. Their lack of social standing means that their needs cannot be met by their own voice and thus they depend on others to advocate these. However, over time with care provided their abilities are developed and they acquire capabilities that allow for them to become rational and autonomous agents.

However, as Held, like many other care ethicists, focus predominantly on dependency her account faces the same criticisms that care ethics faces on a whole. Whilst dependency was a starting point in the emergence and growth of care ethics, to become a stronger opposition to justice-based theories it requires further development. The limits of expanding beyond a private domain remain a large hurdle to overcome. Therefore, I argue that if care ethics is to advance and overcomes its own problematic nature it must turn to an account that focuses on vulnerability, in this case Martha Fineman’s vulnerability thesis, rather than dependency.

(ii) Fineman on vulnerability and care

The importance of Martha Fineman’s vulnerability account is to offer a more theoretically powerful notion, as compared to dependency. Vulnerability is a part of the human condition, and in understanding care as a response to vulnerability it is possible to assemble a wider support network which will call for a more responsive state. This can be seen in current events with the outbreak of COVID-19, which sees government placing more resources and political power to reduce the spread of the virus. This is due to the fact that all humans are, at some level, vulnerable to catching COVID-19 and in the cases of those most vulnerable – the elderly, and those with underlying health conditions – death.

The ethics of care can be seen as a response to human beings and their needs of dependency. Eva Kittay claims that dependents require care, neither the helpless new born infant who requires attention due to their complete dependency and vulnerability on others, nor the frail, but functioning, elderly individual who is reliant on assistance to continue daily tasks, will survive or thrive without another who meets their needs. Despite care being defined in terms of personal dependency relationships, Held highlights that care is a fundamental aspect for an individual’s survival and development into rational beings, ergo deserving public consideration. This can further be emphasized by Joan Tronto who also notes the public significance care holds.

Western justice theories hold a political liberalism that characterizes a liberal legal agent as the ideal citizen; someone who is independent, autonomous, and fully functioning. For them, the world is defined by the self, with minimal societal responsibility or intervention as it goes against the individual’s liberty. The family and care remain a private domain, yet the vulnerability theory set out by Fineman challenges this, arguing for the awareness of the links between the individual and social relations.

The vulnerability theory, set out by Fineman, acknowledges that human beings are interconnected in a web of relations within their society and institutions. Disregarding the traditional dominant view of the individual agent, one can see the dynamic of the ‘vulnerable legal subject’ – where a constant state of vulnerability is unavoidable through the course of life. Vulnerability can come in the form of dependency on caregivers and assistance, as well as continuous dependency on society to allow for social arrangements to occur. This vulnerability is inherent within human nature, a fixed and constant feature that is inextricable from the human condition.

Since much of the arguments for care ethics begin at home from personal dependencies, they remain susceptible to containment strategies; that means that care practices could continue to be limited to the private sphere of life that they first emerged from. Those within the public sphere of life may argue to keep care ethics within its limited scope that rests on a close-knit web of relations, that can also further reinforce gendered notions of behaviour – especially the work of women in the household. In response to this, Tronto’sdefinition of care understands it on the most general level. She suggests that caring be viewed “as a species activity that includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible.”This world that Tronto talks of is a world which includes our bodies, our environment, and ourselves, all of which oneseeks to interconnect into a complex, life-sustaining web of relationships.

Vulnerability is experienced by all individuals and is adequate justification for state action. It is central to the human condition and cannot be enclosed to the private realm. It is often the reason that many political institutions are created. Care in terms of dependency faces limits as it often only can be applied to specific short spans of a person’s life, whereas if care is defined in terms of vulnerability it creates a wider scope that can be defined in terms of everything that one does to limit the exposure and susceptibility to harm one faces. Recasting care in terms of vulnerability can liberate it from the constraints of dependency and avoid the containment strategies Fineman described.

Yet it needs to be noted that some of the vulnerabilities we face can be good for us. Examples of these range from engaging in close personal relationships with others, to thrill seekers who use the adrenaline of dangerous activities to create happiness and excitement within their lives. Therefore, care ethics does not aim to reduce all forms of vulnerability,rather only those which are undesirable or unwanted. Creating a broader scope for the refinement of care by shifting from dependency to vulnerability it encompasses more as it no longer solely involves more than just attending and responding to dependency.  

With this shift, meeting the needs of dependents is no longer the core value of care ethics. Since this broader notion of vulnerability is now able to include all forms of (undesired and non-voluntary) human vulnerability. For example, the need for a basic form of protection continuously throughout life is now understood as a form of care due to a modified account of care ethics, whereby care is no longer solely about attending to the needs of those dependent on caregivers. With this new scope, personal liberties become a direct concern for the care ethicist, as basic freedoms and liberties become important in aiding individuals from vulnerabilities.

Revising care under vulnerability allows for a better understanding of the needs of care and caregivers. When a person or an institution provides care, it is almost always more than just attending to the cared-for’s dependencies; it also includes an array of other factors that constitute their social wellbeing. Although it is not always the case, focusing on care in terms of dependency can often lead to a narrow biological approach to caring. However, if care is centred round the vulnerability individuals are susceptible to, it gives rise to various other factors that caregivers should consider.

One way of capturing this difference between two ways of conceptualising care – one based on dependency and the other on vulnerability – is by drawing a distinction between vulnerability-care and dependency-care. In looking at vulnerability-care, it offers a broad scope that includes policies and laws that enact to reduce their own and others’ susceptibility to human vulnerabilities, whereas dependency-care refers to a narrower scope of personal attention. Since all individuals are susceptible to various forms of vulnerability it seems as though this should then equate to moral obligations and duties of justice. Contractarian approaches to moral theory are flawed since they don’t recognise the normative significance of vulnerability and dependency. Human dependency and obligation to care for dependents call into question the contractarian assumption that obligations toward those in need arise from reciprocal relations of mutual advantage among equal citizens.

Martha Fineman reconceptualises vulnerability by dissociating it from the negative connotations of dependency, such as those relating to helplessness and victimhood, by shifting towards the view of vulnerability as an ontological condition. Vulnerability is embedded within ethics of care within its paternalistic social relations used to assist and maintain the web of relations. However, paternalism is often seen as morally problematic, and often refers to the interference of a government that, without consent, has anature of limiting a person’s autonomy or liberty. Whilst Fineman’s notion of vulnerability isn’t directly placed within refining a new care ethicist theory, I feel it is paramount that it is drawn on as it offers a new, broader way of looking at problems that have previously been grouped into either the private or public sphere.

(iii) Revising Held’s care account with vulnerability

Care ethics has primarily been discussed in relation to dependency, and no reconstruction has been attempted with Fineman’s concept in mind. This section aims to draw my previous chapters and attempt to frame some initial steps towards refining Virginia Held’s care ethics account by supplementing it with Fineman’s vulnerability approach.

If Held bases her account in terms of vulnerability-care, rather than dependency-care, it would allow for the inclusion of a wider variation of factors that the individual can face. For example, all human beings are vulnerable to ageing and getting old; however, not all old persons will be dependent on caregivers. Factors that decide this dependency stem from both situational and inherent factors.

For Held, “…the ethics of care starts with the moral claim of particular others, for instance, of one’s child, whose claims can be compelling regardless of universal principles”, whereby a moral obligation arises out of the vulnerability of a helpless infant who needs care. Held’s account does not see caring practices as all valued, they must meet a moral requirement, there can be bad care, and this needs to be distinguished from good care. If caring practices are not the only foundation, then something else must be there too, and I argue that Fineman’s vulnerability, rather than dependency outlook will allow for a moral justification in understanding and recognising what care experiences are valuable and are a part of care ethics.

If the ethics of care incorporates a vulnerable subject model it can allow for a revised outlook on state responsibility and of what individuals owe each other in virtue of being citizens. This contrasts the dominant outlook of individuals as autonomous agents that gives emphasis to a state that tends not to intervene. If Held’s account incorporates Fineman’s approach about vulnerability within her care ethics, along with acknowledging the relationality of autonomy, then the issue of autonomy and vulnerability as opposing accounts dissolves.  

Human beings are vulnerable from birth to death, embedded in a multitude of dependencies. In seeing the universality and consistency of vulnerability we can see the contradiction to the dominant individualist conception that the ethics of justice holds the liberal subject to have. Rather than focusing on the limited moments of dependency individuals have, byacknowledging the unavoidable vulnerability all individualsshare it remains constant that everyone faces it at some point within their lives. Although, it must be noted that this level of vulnerability differs between each individual. In understanding it in these terms it calls for a more responsive state intervention, with less reliance on caregivers – especially in the private realm of the home and family. It moves away from what started as a specifically feminist ethic, thereby resolving the problem of some feminists who criticise the ethics of care for reinforcing gendered stereotypes, and thus moves to a more inclusive notion of all caring for all since we are all vulnerable to things both with and out with our control.

If care was to be reframed in terms of vulnerability, it can provide a solution for the problems previously faced by care ethics. As previously discussed, vulnerability is part of the human condition that affects everyone throughout their entire lives. The vulnerability humans are susceptible to not only comes from our own self, but from the social environment we are exposed to, requiring a shift from a previous private notion of care towards a public platform.  

IV. Conclusion

This dissertation has argued that the emergence of care ethics has been fundamental in offering a more inclusive moral theory, compared to dominant justice-based approaches. However, with a modification that centres vulnerability rather than dependency, care ethics can shift away from previous criticisms first faced. In the first chapter, I outlined the key differences between the ethics of care and the ethics of justice. The chapter aimed to show the difference between justice theories and care theories, with reference to Virginia Held’saccount, and how justice theories possibly offer a better approach as it is more universal with its principles. Furthermore, unlike care ethics, justice theories look at the whole life of an individual, whereas the focus on dependency – within care ethics – refers to only specific parts of a person’s life. The second chapter explained the difference between dependency and vulnerability and sought to challenge justice theories insofar as they lack much awareness of the dependency and vulnerability that all individuals face, given that they rest predominantly on autonomy.  Finally, the third chapter centred back to Held’s care account and looks at what it lacks with reference to Fineman’s vulnerability theory. Although Fineman’s vulnerability claim isn’t explicitly framed within care ethics, I have argued that it can build a more inclusive theory that can take into account both traditional care and justice-based accounts as vulnerability affects both dependent and autonomous agents. If care ethics  were to be reframed with vulnerability as the core focus, it would expand into the political and legal aspects of life, which are predominantly ruled by justice theories, providing a more inclusive moral theory that takes into account inescapable human vulnerability.

Bibliography

Code, L. (1991). “The Autonomy of Reason.” In What Can She Know?: Feminist Theory and the Construction of Knowledge. Cornell University Press, pp. 110-172.

Dodds, S. (2014). “Dependence, Care, and Vulnerability.” In Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics and Feminist Philosophy, edited by Catriona Mackenzie, Wendy Rogers, and Susan Dodds. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 181-203.

Donchin, A. (2000). “Autonomy and Interdependence: Quandaries in Genetic Decision Making.” In Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self, edited by Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 236-258.

Engster, D. (2007). The Heart of Justice: Care Ethics and Political Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Engster, D. (2018). “Care Ethics, Dependency, and Vulnerability”, Ethics and Social Welfare, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 100-114.

Friedman, M. (2008). “Care Ethics and Moral Theory: Review Essay of Virginia Held, The Ethics of Care”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 77, No. 2, pp. 539-555.

Fineman, M. (2010). “The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State”, Emory Law Journal, Vol. 60, pp. 251-275.

Gilligan, C. (1982). In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Held, V. (2004). Care and Justice in the Global Context, inRatio Juris. Vol. 17 No. pp. 141–55.

Held, V. (2006). The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global. New York: Oxford University Press.

Held, V. (2015). “Care and Human Rights.” In ThePhilosophical Foundations of Human Rights, edited byRowan Cruft, Matthew Liao, and Massimo Renzo. London: Oxford University Press, pp. 624-641.

Ignatieff, M. (1984). The Needs of Strangers. London: Hogarth.

Kant, I. (1948). Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (1785), translated and analysed by H.J. Paton. New York: Harper & Row.

Kymlicka, W. (2002) “Feminism”, in Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 377-430.

Mendus, S. (2015). “Care and Human Rights A Reply to Virginia Held.” In The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights, edited by. Rowan Cruft, Matthew Liao, and MassimoRenzo. London: Oxford University Press, pp. 642-652.

Nussbaum, M. (2007). Frontiers of Justice, Disability, Nationality, Species Membership. Cambridge, MA.: BelknapPress.

O’Neill, O. (1992). “Justice, Gender, and International Boundaries”. In International Justice and the Third World,edited by R. Attfield and B. Wilkins. London: Routledge, pp.47-72.

Oxford English Dictionary. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Robinson, F. (1999). Globalizing Care: Ethics, Feminist Theory, and International Relations.

Boulder, Co.: Westview.

Tronto, J. (1994). Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care. New York: Routledge.

2